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INTRODUCTION
It may seem somewhat presumptuous of an academic lawver 
to speak to a group of practitioners on a matter of such everyday 
importance as executions. Yet I believe there are few subjects in 
greater need of academic treatment and reform than this one. For 
however excellent our substantive law may be, it is only as good 
as the remedies to enforce it. The need' for reform in this rield 
I hope to demonstrate by a discussion of some aspects of the 
writ of fieri facias. Only a few aspects I may say, and those not 
exhaustively for time does not permit. But I hope to convince you 
of the need for a thorough study of the matter followed by leg­
islative action.
The writ of fieri facias (or fi f a ) is the maid of all work in the 
law of execution. So much is this so that in ordinary parlance 
when we speak of issuing execution we mean the fieri facias. It 
commands the sheriff to cause to be made (fieri facias) out of the 
lands and chattels of a judgment debtor an amount sufficient 
to pay the judgment creditor with costs.1 The writ has been the 
most usual mode of execution for a long time; it is of great anti­
quity, dating to the earliest days of the common law.2 This 
explains many things about the writ. It explains, first of all its 
extreme technicality, and, as we shall see, it assists in determining 
what property of the debtor may be seized under the writ. A 
discussion of problems respecting what property is seizable under 
the writ comprises the major portion of this talk, but before 
dealing with tnis I want to say a few words concerning a matter 
that is in crving need of reform — the binding effect of the writ.
• Y. I.a Forest. II.C..I.. (I .N.H.). M.A. (Oxon). of the Faculty of l aw 
University of New Brunswick.
X The following substantially reproduces a talk delivered as part of a sympos­
ium arranged by the Faculty of Law of the University of New Brunswick 
at the Mid-winter Meeting of the New Brunswick Section of the Canadian 
Bar Association held at Fredericton. N. B.. February 20 and 21. 19.')9.
1. Rules of the Supreme Court of New Brunswick. I9.*>6 (hereinafter 
referred to as R.S.C.), App. H. Forms Nos. 1-4.
2. See IMucknett, A Concise History of the C million Law. 4th Ed., p. !M»9: 
Bollock and Maitland. History of l'nglish Law. vol. II. p. .r>9(>; Tidd’s 
Practice, vol. 2. p. 993.
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BINDING E F F E C T  OF WRIT
At common law, the writ had effect from its teste. As soon 
as it was issued it bound the goods of the execution debtor into 
whosoever hands they came. So that if an execution debtor sold 
his goods after the issue of the writ, the execution creditor had a 
right to seize them even as against a bona-fide purchaser for value 
without noticc.:< The English Statute of Frauds4 made an impor­
tant alteration to this law. It provided, in effect, that the writ 
should not bind the goods of an execution debtor until it was 
delivered to the sheriff to be executed. This provision has been 
adopted as section 11 of the New Brunswick Statute of Frauds,5 
a necessary provision here because since a solicitor can obtain 
blank writs and fill them out as occasion reauires,6 it would be 
extremely difficult to determine just when the writ was issued.
It should be observed that the provision in the Statute of 
Frauds merely postpones the time when the writ binds the goods 
of the execution debtor; it does not otherwise alter the law. So 
that if a judgment debtor sells goods to an innocent purchaser 
after the writ has been placed in the hands of the sheriff for 
execution, the sheriff may seize the goods in the hands of the 
innocent purchaser.7
This blemish on the law was removed in England by section 
1 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, which provided 
that no writ of fieri facias should prejudice the right of any
f>erson to goods acquired from an execution debtor in good faith, or valuable consideration and without notice.8 This section and 
the provision of the Statute of Frauds just mentioned, were re- 
cnactcd by section 26 of the English Sale of Goods Act.9 Un­
fortunately when the Sale of Goods Act was adopted by New 
Brunswick in 1919,10 section 26 was not reproduced. The effect 
is that in New Brunswick if a person buys goods from a judgment 
debtor against whom a writ has been placed in the sheriff’s nands 
for execution, those goods are subject to a lien and the purchaser 
will be liable to the judgment creditor for the value of the goods 
if the judgment debtor has not sufficient assets to satisfy the
3. D oe d. Xesm ith i'. W illislon  (1844) 4 N.B.R. 459; W oodland x>. Fuller 
(1840) 11 Ad. fc K. 858; 113 K.R. 641.
4. (1677) 29 Car. II. c. 3. s. 16.
R.S.N.B., 1952, c. 218.
6. See R.S.C. Ord. 5. rr. I. 2; Old. 61, r. I.
7. Doe d. Xesmitli r<. W illislon  (1844) 4 N.B.R. 419; W oodland v. Fuller 
(1840) 11 Ad. k  K. 858; 113 K.R. 641.
8. 19 k  20 Viet., c. 97, s. I.
9. (1893) 56 & 57 Vie!., c. 71.
10. 8 (.co. V. c. 4.
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debt. Clearly this situation is entirely unfair and I suggest our 
legislature should remedy the situation by repealing section 11 of 
the Statute of Frauds and enacting a section similar to section 
26 of the Fnglish Sale of Goods Act in its stead.
So far wc have directed our attention to goods. Under section 
5 of the Memorials and Execution Act,11 lands, too, are bound 
by the writ from the time it is placed in the hands of the sheriff. 
There is no objection to this as regards land because when a 
purchaser buys land he does or should make enquiries to the 
sheriff. But there is another aspect regarding the binding effect 
on lands that needs examination. This relates to priority among 
judgment creditors and the cffcct of memorials.
At common law, if several writs of fieri facias were delivered 
to the sheriff lie had to executc them in accordance with the 
order in which he received them. Priority as between judgment 
creditors, therefore, was based on the time they placed their 
executions in the sheriff’s hands.12 The Creditors’ Relief Act 
altered this. Section 3 of that Act provides that in general there 
shall be no priority among execution creditors, and section 4 
provides that where a sheriff levies moncv upon a writ, he shall 
distribute the moncv ratcablv amongst ail creditors whose writs 
are in his hands or who deliver writs to him within one month.13
But a judgment debtor, of course, does not have to issue a 
writ of execution. He may instead choose to file a memorial of 
judgment in the Registry Office. If he does, under section 5 of 
the Memorials and Executions Act it binds the lands, though 
not the goods, of the judgment debtor. This gives rise to the 
following problem. Suppose A, a judgment creditor, files a mem­
orial of execution in tne Registry Office against his debtor X. 
Subsequently, C, D and F  issue execution and X ’s land is sold 
to a third party Y. Under section 4 of the Creditors Relief Act, 
C , D and E share rateably in the proceeds of the sale. Y acquires 
the land but it is a recognized principle that a purchaser at a 
sheriff’s sale acquires the rights of the judgment debtor but no 
more. Now by virtue of section 5 of the Memorials and Execu­
tions Act, this land is bound by A’s memorial. Does this mean 
that A may, following the sheriff’s sale, issue execution to seize 
the lands in the hands of Y, the purchaser under the sheriff’s 
sale? In the absence of judicial legislation, this would appear to 
follow from the language of the Memorial and Executions Act 
and common law principle. Surely there should be legislation to 
clarify the situation.
11. R.S.X.H.. I!)12. t. I 13.
12. Hunt Ilonftrv  (ISM) 12 M. it \V. <>64; IV2 F.H. I3<>1.
15. R.S \.H.. I<>.12, i . 1<>.
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WHAT MAY BE SEIZED  UNDER THE WRIT
(a) The Common Law Position
I turn now to what may be seized under a writ of fieri facias. 
The first point to observe is that the judgment creditor obtains 
at most the interest of the judgment debtor in the property seiz­
ed, so he is subject to previously acquired rights or otners relat­
ing to it. This can be exemplified by The Continental Trusts Co. 
v. The Mineral Products Co.Xi before Barker, J. There a company 
executed a mortgage of lands in New Brunswick. The mortgage 
included the minerals but at the time the minerals were vested 
in the Crown, not in the company. Later, mining leases were 
issued to the company by the province, so in equity the minerals 
were subject to the mortgage. A judgment creditor had the leases 
seized, bought in at the sheriff’s sale and paid the Crown rent 
overdue under the leases, whereupon the Crown having no know­
ledge of the mortgage, issued the mining leases in the judgment 
creditor’s own name. It was held that the leases were still subject 
to the mortgage. In the course of his judgment, Barker, J. said:
I take it as long since settled that a purchaser at a Sheriff's 
»ale under an execution stands in no better or different posi­
tion as to the property than the execution debtor did. In W ick­
ham  j>. T h e Xnv liniuswick  & Canada Hallway Co. . . . Lord  
Chelmsford says: “There is no doubt upon principle as well 
as on the authority of the cases cited in the arguncnt at the 
Bar. that the right of a judgment creditor under an execution 
is to take the precise interest, and no more, which the debtor 
possesses in the property seized, and consequently that such 
property must lie sc Id by the Sheriff with all the charges ami 
incumbrances, legal and equitable, to which it was subject in 
the hands of the debtor.I-"*
Though sometimes difficult of application, the foregoing 
principle is well known. W hat is not so well known are the types 
of interests that can be seized under the writ. Can, for example, 
an equity of redemption be seized? Or a joint tenancy? Or the 
interest of a buyer —  or a seller — under a conditional sale?
The best way to answer auestions of this kind is to approach 
the matter historically. I sain a few moments ago that the writ 
is perhaps as old as the common law itself, and this should give 
us some idea of its original scope. In its origin onlv goods could 
be seized under the writ. This is only to be expected, foT in feudal 
times land was much too important a commodity to allow it to 
be taken by a mere judgment creditor. In those days, it will be 
remembered, the relation of a man to his land determined his
14. (1904) 3 N.B. Kq. R. 28. 
I'». I hid., at p. 39.
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'.tatus in society.10 It was not until 1285 that by the Statute of 
W estminster If17 land was made exigible by another writ, the 
writ of elegit. But this writ did not authorize the land to be 
seized and sold. Rather, after seizure the land was delivered to 
the judgment creditor who held it as a tenant by elegit until his 
debts were paid out of the profit of the land. In so far as Canada 
and other British possessions are concerned', we shall see 
that sale of lands was later permitted but that was not so in Eng­
land. There the writ of efigit continued to be the appropriate 
remedy available to a judgment creditor against the lands of his 
judgment debtor until 1056.1H The important point to notice 
about this is that the writ of elegit is a very different remedv 
from the writ of fi fa  and English eases on executions against land 
must be read with considerable caution. A second point to note 
is that seizure of land by fi fa  must be done under authoritv of 
statute.
I also said that the writ was a common law' writ. Now as 
everybody knows equitable interests were not lecognizcd in com­
mon law courts. Equitable interests could, therefore, not be 
seized under a writ of fi fa,iy> and any seizure of equitable interests 
todav must consequently be effected under some statute.
A third lesson can be learned from the great age of the writ. 
At its inception the forms of property were not diverse as thev 
are in our commercial community. Intangible property, such as 
stocks and patents, was unknown. Only tangible goods, chattels, 
could be seized under the writ.20 To the extent that intangible 
property can be seized today it must be done pursuant to statute.
From the foregoing you can surmise that most of what can 
be seized under the writ is done as a result of statutory enact­
ment. The scope of the writ has been expanded piecemeal over 
the centuries as need arose and while it is todav very broad, there 
are surprising and unjustifiable gaps. A study of these followed by 
a comprehensive statute would remove much unnecessarv tech- 
nicalitv. The idea stands as an open invitation to those who seek 
the reform of the law.
1C». For i Me early common law altitude, see Pollock and Maitland. History 
of English Law, vol. II, p. 590; Plucknett. \ Concise History of the 
Common I.aw, 4th Ed.. p. 309.
17. 13 Fdw. I. c. 18.
IS. By the Administration of Justice Act. 19.’>0. 4 S: Fliz. II, c. 40 writs 
of elegit may no longer he issued in England. In II'rirlmmi McClary 
Mini. Co. (1917) 33 D.E.R. (»72 it was held that the writ of elegit is no 
longer applicable to the Northwest Territories, and it is suggested that 
is true of New Brunswick also.
19. \ro ll i'. Srholey  (1807) 8 East 407: 103 F.R. 423.
20. See H tinisoti j >. Pnxiiter (1840) (i M. ¡v \V. 387: 151 F.R. 402: N'roll <*. 
Srholey (I8!»7) 8 Fast 407: 103 F.R. 123.
44 U .N .B .  LA W  JOURNAL
(b) The Position Today respecting Chattels
Having now examined the scopc of the writ at common 
law, wc arc in a position to examine the changes wrought by 
statutes. I will first examine the personal property now seizable 
iih clcr the writ, and then the real property.
As we saw, at common law die only personal property that 
could be seized under the f i f a  was chattels. Chattels, of course, 
comprised tangible moveable prcperty but the term also included 
chattels real or leasehold property, which, as you well know, were 
not considered to be the real property. Section 23(1) of the Memor­
ials and Executions Act now expressly provides that goods and 
chattels, including leasehold interests may be seized and sold.21 A 
leasehold can be seized even when it contains a covenant against 
assignment, because as may be seen from D oe d. Mitchinson v. 
Carter,2- in the absence of clear terms, such a covenant refers to 
voluntary assignments.
So far we have been concerned with the situation where the 
judgment debtor owns the chattel seized absolutely. But what 
if he has given a mortgage on it? A mortgage, as you know, is the 
transfer of the legal title to goods to the mortgagee. In law, all 
the mortgagor has left is a contractual right against the mortgagee, 
but this is not property and' cannot be seized. Equity, however, 
gives him a species of property called an eauity of redemption. 
This, at common law, could not be seized because it was an 
equitable interest.2* Now, however, by virtue of section 23(1) of 
the Memorials and Executions Act an equity of redemption in 
goods may be seized, and by virtue of section 1(a) of that Act 
this term includes the interest of a person who has given a second 
mortgage on the goods.24 But suppose a writ of [i fa  is issued ? 
against the mortgagee of a chattel. Can his interest be seized? 
According to the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ferrie u. Cleghorn25 
“the interest of a mortgagee in goods mortgaged to him is not 
an interest that can be sokl under a fi fa . . It would be 
necessary to obtain a garnishee order to attach the debt owed to 
the mortgagee under the mortgage.2" Theie is, therefore, a 
remedy available to the judgment creditor, but I think a simpler 
procedure than a garnishee order could be devised.
21. R.S.N.B., 1932. c. 143.
22. (1798) 8 T .R . J>7; 101 E.R. 1204.
23. Scalt v. Sclioley (1807) 8 East 407; 103 E.R. 423.
24. R.S.X.B.. I9.V2. c. 143: see also R.S.N.B., I9'>2. c. ")0. s. 30.
2.r>. (1800) 19 ll.C.O.Ii. 211. at p. 244; sec also H enderson v. Fortune (18’>9) 
18 l  .C.Q.B. .r>2(K
20. See Garnishee Act. R.S.N.B., I9"»2. c. 97.
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Ear more common than the chattel mortgagee as a security 
dcvice is the conditional sale. There A, the conditional seller, 
transfers possession of a chattel to the conditional buyer, B, but 
A retains title to the goods. Can the sheriff seize the interest of 
the conditional buyer in the goods? There is nothing in our 
statutes, as there is in the statutes of some of the other provinces, 
permitting the seizure of the interest of a conditional buyer so wc 
must turn to the common law. If it is an equitable interest as some 
judges suggest,27 it cannot be seized under a writ otfieri facias 
because equitable interests are not seizable under a fi fa  in the 
absencc of statute, and even if it is legal the cases of Ruscheinsky 
v. Spencer-* and Overby v. M c L e a n indicate that it cannot be 
seized. If, therefore, A buys a car worth $3,000 under a condition­
al sale agreement, it is very doubtful if the car can be seized by 
A’s creditors even if he has paid, say, $2,500. It seems to me that 
the interest of a conditional buyer should be exigible and that 
legislation should be passed accordingly.
Let us take the opposite situation. A sells a car to B under 
a conditional sale. Can the creditors of A, the conditional seller, 
have the car seized under a fieri facias It would appear that the 
car cannot be seized because the conditional buyer is rightfullv 
in possession. Taking possession under these circumstances would 
constitute a trespass, and this the sheriff is not empowered to 
do.30 However, trie creditor should be able to garnishee the debt 
owing under the conditional sale, but the garnishee is, as you 
know, rather a complicated remedy.
The principle that the sheriff cannot commit a trespass 
against a third person applies in other cases as well. Thus if a 
judgment debtor has pledged or leased* goods, they cannot be 
seized while in the possession of the pledgee or lessee.31
As has been mentioned before, at common law an equitable 
interest in chattels could not be seized under a fi fa. This can be 
exemplified by Scott v. Scholey32 where it was held that a mere 
equitable interest in a term of years could not be taken into 
execution under a f i f a .  In the judgment of Lord Ellenborough, 
there is a passage that gives such an excellent statement of the 
attitude of the law regarding the fi fa as to merit quotation. He 
savs:
27. See Itusrlif insky i*. N/» u rn  Sc ('o. [1948] 2 W.W.R. '»8. at p. 00.
28. Ibid .
2‘1. [1928] 1 D.I..R. 917.
.1(1. See K innrar v. Kinnnn  (11124) 2<> O.W.X. III .
SI. Young v. Imiiibcrt (1870) 1..R. .‘i I’.C'.. 142 (pledgee); Kinut-tn v. k in n n n  
( I *>24) 2<i O.W.X. III .  and in itr r  i>. Jenkins  (1888» 20 N.S.R. 4MI (lessee».
32. (1807) 8 Kasl 4<«7: 10!» K.R. 123.
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I'hc language of these writs and return evidently imports, that 
the goods and chattels, which are the ob ject of them, are 
propcrlx of a tangible nature, capable of manual seizure, and 
ol being detained in the sheriff's hands and custody, and such 
also as are conveniently capable of sale and transfer by the 
sheriff, to whom the writ is directed, for the satisfaction of 
a creditor. T h e  legal interest in a term of years, lx>th in respect 
of the possession of which the leasehold property itself is cap­
able, and also in respect of the instrum ent by which the term 
is created and secured, (both of which are capable of delivery 
to a vendee.) has l>een always held to answer the description 
of the writ, and to be saleable thereunder . . . .  Blit no single 
instance is to be found in the history and practice of the Courts 
of Common I.aw, in which an equitable interest in a term 
of yea is has ever been recognized as saleable, (sei/able of 
course it cannot be.) under a fieri facias.83
T o  the rule that equitable interests in chattels were not exigible 
there was one exception, namely, where the debtor was entitled 
to the whole beneficial interest in the chattel, for there he 
could if he wished have had the legal title transferred to him .84 
A judgment creditor cannot avoid having goods seized simply by 
putting them behind a bare trust. B u t if he does not have the 
whole beneficial interest in a chattel, it cannot be seized under 
a fi fa, and resort must be had to equitable execution.
Thusfar I have confined myself to tangible personal property. 
Let us now direct our attention to intangible property'. And first 
of money. At common law money could never be seized under a 
fi fa. T h e  strictness of this rule can be seen in Fieldhouse v. 
Croft35 where the sheriff held money belonging to the judgment 
debtor, the surplus of a former execution against the judgment 
debtor. T h e money thus in the sheriff’s hands could not be seized 
under a subsequent execution and had to be returned to the 
judgment debtor. Now section 26(1) of the Memorials and 
Executions Act provides that “T h e  sheriff on any execution shall 
seize and take any money including any surplus of a prior execu­
tion . . ,”36 T h e power to seize money is not in general too 
valuable because there is, for example, no right to search a 
debtor.37
In common with money, other forms of intangible propertv 
could not be levied against.38 Section 26 of the Memorials and 
Executions Act now provides, however, that chcques, bills of
33. ( 18()7) 8 Fast 467, at p. 484; 103 F..R. 423. at p. 429.
34. Strr>ens v. Hitter (1914) MO L .T .R . 93.'».
3*>. (I804) 4 Fast 510; 102 F..R. 926; see also Hradlry i>. ntid (iau lt
( 1828) I N .B.R . I47.
30. R .S.N .B .. 1952, c. 143.
37. Yakimishyn v. Iiilrski [1946] 1 W .W .R . 663.
38. H tin ¡son v. Piiyiilri (1840) 6 M. & W . 387; l.*»l F..R. 462.
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exchange, promissory notes, bonds, specialities and other secur­
ities for money may be seized, and tlic sheriff may hold these 
for the benefit of the judgment creditor and maintain an action 
thereon. Any payment made to the sheriff discharges the party 
liable under these securities.30
Again, at common law debts were not seizable.40 Now, of 
coursc, they can be garnished by the judgment creditor under 
the Garnishee A ct,41 but in addition where there are several 
executions, the sheriff mav obtain an order attaching the debts 
himself under section 35 of the Creditors’ Relief Act,42 but I 
have never heard of this procedure being used in this province.
liven shares and dividends of a stockholder in any incorpor­
ated company in New Brunswick may be seized. This is done 
bv the sheriff s serving a copv of the execution upon the company 
and a notice stating that the judgment creditor’s stock in the 
company is seized, and a simple procedure is provided in section 
23 or the Memorials and Executions Act for tlie sale of these for 
the benefit of the judgment creditor.43
Before going on to interests in land, I might mention goods 
and chattels that cannot be seized1 under execution. Section 33 
of the Memorials and Executions Act exempts from seizure cer­
tain domestic and personal cffccts, tools and other materials 
required bv the debtor in making a living, and certain govern­
ment annuities.44 Again section 39 of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act, provides that chattels on leased land are not liable to execu­
tion unless the judgment creditor pays the landlord1 any rent then 
due up to one year’s rent. And section 40 provides that standing 
crops continue to be liable for distress for rent even though they 
have been sold by the sheriff.45
L et us now examine the extent to which real property may 
be seized under the fieri facias. As I mentioned earlier, at com ­
mon law the writ was originally confined to goods and chattels. 
Land could be executed against by means of the writ of eligit. 
But in 1732 £ "  ’ ’ 1 ' tute provided that lands and other
39. R .S.N .B., 1952, c. 143.
40. Harrison i>. Paynter (1840) fi M. R: VV. 387; 151 F..R. 462.
41. R .S.N .B .. 1952, c. 97.
42. R .S .X .B ., 1952. c. 50.
43. R .S.N .B ., 1952. c. 143.
44. Ibid .
45. R .S .X .B .. 1952. c. l ‘JG.
(c) T h e  Position Today respecting Land
heriditaments estate in the colonies were subject
48 U .N .B . LAW JOURNAL
to the same remedies as might be used against personal property.4'* 
Now since the/ten facias was the usual process used to recover 
against personal property, this meant, in effect, that lands became 
subject to seizure under that writ in British possessions. Further, 
one of the first statutes passed bv the New Brunswick legislature47 
made lands subject to seizure, with one qualification, that person­
al property must first be seized. This statute was re-enacted from 
tim e to tim e48 and now appears as section 11 of the Memorials 
and Executions Act49 which reads in part as follows:
11. T he lands of a person may be seized and sold under execu 
tion as personal estate to satisfy his debts, . . . but the sheriff 
to whom the writ of fieri facias is directed shall not sell the 
lands until the personal estate, if any is found, is e x h a u s te d ...
T h e  scope of this section must depend on the meaning of the 
word “lands” . T h e  term is given a fairly extensive meaning in 
section 1(d) of the Act. This section provides first of all that 
lands include the possessory right and right of entry (i.e. the 
right to possess against a squatter).50 This means that present 
legal estates in fee simple or for life can be seized.
In the absence of express provision equitable interests can­
not be seized, for it should not be forgotten that the fi fa is a 
common law writ.51 True the definition of “lands” in the M em ­
orials and Executions Act mentions equitable interests but the 
definition only includes equitable interest that are other­
wise seizable under the Act.52 Section 12 of the Act looks prom­
ising. It reads:
12. T he right of the party beneficially interested in lands held 
in trust for him , may be taken in execution for the payment 
of his debts, in the same manner as if he were seized or jjossess- 
ed of the lands, and his equitable and legal estate shall vest 
in the purchaser.
However, there is good reason to believe that this section only 
permits seizing equitable interests when the whole beneficial 
interest in the lana belongs to the judgment debtor; where under 
the rule in Saunders v. Vautier53 the debtor could require the 
legal title to be tranferred to him. T h e  last words in the section 
providing that the purchaser of such interest obtains both the
46. 5 Geo. II, c. 7.
47. (1786) 26 Geo. I l l ,  c. 12.
48. Its early history is discussed in Doe d. H azni x>. Hazen (1854) 8 N .B .R  
87.
49. R .S.N .B., 1952. c. 143.
50. Ib id ., s. 1 (d).
51. Scott v. Scholey  (1807) 8 East 467; 103 E.R. 423.
52. R .S.N .B., 1952. c. 143. s. 1 (d).
53. (1841) 4 Reav. 115; 49 F..R. 282; affd. Cr. & Ph. 240; 41 F..R. 482
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legal and equitable right suggests this view and it is supported 
to some extent by authority. In Doe d. Hull v. Greenhill* * a trust 
in favour of a judgment aebtor and another person was held not 
to fall within a rather similar section in an English statute.55 It 
is submitted, therefore, that equitable interests less than the total 
beneficial interest in the land cannot be seized under a/t fa. The 
appropriate remedy would appear to be equitable execution bv 
means of a receiver.
Let us now turn to lands that arc encumbered with a mort­
gage. Can the interest of the mortgagor be seized, and can that 
of the mortgagee? As regards a mortgagor, this interest could not 
have been seized at common law because it existed only in equity , 
but land as defined in section 1(d) of the Memorials and Execu­
tions Act expressly includes the equity of redemption of a mort­
gagor.5” And by section 20 the purchaser of an equity of redemp­
tion from the sheriff acquires all the rights of the mortgagor, and 
by making the mortgage payments as and when due Tie may 
acquire full title to the Tana.57
But what of the mortgagee's interest: can this be seized An 
early New Brunswick case, Doe d. Vernon v. White,™ answers this 
question in the negative. But sections 24 and 25 of the Memorials 
and Executions Act now provide an excellent remedy against a 
judgment debtor who owns a registered mortgage.5’* W hen a 
notice in the form set forth in section 24 is registered in the 
registry office and served on the mortgagee, the mortgage debt 
is attached and becomes payable to the sheriff —  a most efficient 
procedure. T h e remedy is, However, available only when the mort­
gage is registered; otherwise one must resort to garnishee proceed­
ings. T h e remedy should be extended to unregistered mortgages, 
though I quite understand that the judgment creditor is not 
as likely to know of the existence of such mortgages. A similar 
remedy should also be devised covering the interests of chattcl 
mortgagees and conditional sellers.
Sometimes, instead of giving a deed and taking a mortgage 
in return, a vendor of land will enter an agreement of sale under 
which he retains the title but gives up possession to the buyer and 
agrees to transfer the title to the buyer when a number of 
monthly or yearly instalments have been paid (a transaction relat­
ing to land that resembles a conditional sale of goods). As a secur­
•">4. 4 B. & Ad. 684: 106 K.R. 1087.
r».j. (1677) 29 Car. II. c. 3. s. 10.
56. R .S.N .B.. 1952. c. 143.
57. Ibid., s. 20; see also, s. 21.
58. (1859) 9 N .B.R . 314.
59. R .S.N .B.. 1952. r. 143.
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ity (levicc this seems as good as a mortgage. T h e  vendor has the 
title until the instalments arc paid ami the buvcr has an equity 
in the lands. But the important point to note for our purpose is 
that the buyer’s interest is not an equity of redemption, so it docs 
not fall within the dcfininion of “lands” in the Memorials and 
Executions Act. Nor is it a trust. T h e effect is that this interest 
cannot be seized under a fieri facias; it would" be necessary to seek 
the appointment of a receiver.“0 Further the vendor is not a 
mortgagor so that the convenient remedy I mentioned above is 
not available against him if he is a judgment debtor. B u t he has 
the legal title and this, it would seem, can be sOM by the sheriff 
without making an actual physical seizure of the land.“1 T h e 
buvcr under the sheriff’s sale would then be entitled to the pay­
ments owing under the agreement.'” a It is submitted that provis­
ions should be made placing these agreements for sale in virtually 
the same position as mortgages.
Lands, of course, arc often held concurrently with others in 
joint tenancy or as a tenancy in common. Can the interest of a 
joint tenant or tenant in common be seized? Land, wc saw, in­
cludes all possessory rights,”- and this would seem to include such 
concurrent interests. Imrther there is authority in other jurisdic­
tions supporting the view that such interests can be seized.“3 But 
in the case of a joint tenancy, if the judgment debtor dies before 
his interest is sold his joint tenant will take the interest by survi­
vorship in priority to the judgment creditor.04
Up to now the interests of which I have spoken have been 
for the most part present interests. I want to say a word now of 
future interests. Suppose, for example, that A has an estate for 
life in a picce of land, and the remainder or reversion of the fee 
simple belongs to B. a judgment debtor. Can B ’s interest be sold 
uncfer a fi fa ? There is an carlv New Brunswick case. Doe d. 
ilazen v. Hazen,'i5 holding that such interests could be sold under 
execution under the Act of 1786, and while the court there relied 
to some extent on the fact that that statute permitted seizure of 
any hcriditament, other reasoning in the case indicates that the 
law would be the same today.
(ii). Kimniak V. Anderson 63 O .L .R . 428; [1929] 2 D .L .R . 904.
61. Wriihnan j». McClary Man. Co. (1917) 33 D .L .R . 672; cf.. Purke j <. Hi ley 
(|8(*fi) 3 K. & A. 21"), aff. 12 (*r. 69. Set- ;i!m> /)(«■ d. Htr.cn i*. Hazen (1854) 
8 N .R.R. 87. al p. 98 and Sale of Lands I * 111 >1 ica lion Ad. R.S.N.IV. 1952, c. 
200.
61a. See M orion  mu! Coxi’e l l i>. H o ffc r l [l!>24] 2 W .W .R . 529; su b  non i. l i e  
S m i III (I924J 3 D.1..R 16.
62. Memorials and Executions \cl, R .S.N .B., 1952, c. 143, s. I (d).
63. Hr Crain 63 O .L .R . 192; [1929J I D .L .R . 142.
64. Pou'cr v. ( .r a c e  [1932] O .R . 357; [1932] 2 D .L.R. 793.
65. (1854) 8 N.1VR. 87; see also Dor d. Cameron x>. Robinson (1850) 7 
r.c:.i>.B. 335.
It is possible that othei interests in land may be seized. For 
example, it has been suggested in an Ontario ease that a profit 
a prendre may be sold under execution."" 1 think that would be 
true here, especially if. as may well be the case, the English 
statute of 17^2 is in force in this province."7
Finally, the broad definitions of “goods”, “ lands”, and “prop­
erty” in section 38 of the Interpretation Act"* should not be over­
looked. If these apply to the Memorials and Executions Act. it 
is difficult to imagine what interests cannot be seized under a 
fi fa. But these definitions, it should be observed, apply only if 
the context is not inconsistent with the statute concerned,"!* and 
if they arc applicable to the Memorials and Executions Act, it is 
not easy to understand why it is felt neccssary to set forth in 
detail various types of interest that could not be seized at common 
law or to define “ lands” . W h at is more, there is no adequate 
procedure spelled out for seizing many interests. T h e  better view 
would appear to be that these definitions are not applicable to 
the Memorials and Executions Act. but there is cleanv room for 
argument.
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CONCLUSION
T h e  end result, then, would appear to be that the fi fa has 
a very wide scope, probably much wider than the average practi­
tioner suspects. B u t there are gaps that cannot be justified on any 
ground or rational policy. It seems incredible that in the new 
world and in the twentieth century we arc strll reiving on a method 
of execution that was found wanting in the thirteenth. T h e  ideal 
should surely be that no debtor should be able to deprive his 
creditors of their just claims simply because lie is shrewd' enough 
or lucky enough to have his property in one form rather than 
another.
(»(>. l o t t m  i'. (1863) 13 U.C.C.P. 567.
67. r> Geo. II, c. 7. In Doe d. Hazen v. Huzeu (1854) 8 N.IVR 87. it ap p eao 
to be assumed that this statute continues in force.
68. R .S.N .R.. 1952. c. 114. s. 38(13). (17).
6{). Ibid ., s. 1.
The advantage that might 
result to the science of the law 
itself, when a little more attend­
ed to in these seats of know­
ledge, perhaps would be very 
considerable. The leisure and 
ability of the learned in these 
retirements might either suggest 
expedients, or execute those 
dictated by wiser heads, for 
improving its method, retrench­
ing its superfluities, and recon­
ciling the little contrarieties, 
which the practice of many cen­
turies will necessarily create in 
any human system; a task which 
those who are deeply employed 
in business, and the more active 
scenes of the profession, can 
hardly condescend to engage in.
—Sir W illiam  Ulackstone, at the 
opening of the Vinerian lectures 
on the common law at the 
University of O xford, October 
1758.
